For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximalsustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the e¤ects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program. Ex-ante leniency programs are e¤ective if and only if these o¤er substantial rewards to the self-reporting …rm. This is in contrast to currently employed programs that are therefore ine¤ective.
Introduction
During the last two decades, antitrust policies in the US and the EC have undergone substantial reforms and currently include leniency programs as a key ingredient, e.g. US Department of Justice (1993) and EC (2002) . Leniency programs grant total or partial immunity from …nes to …rms collaborating with the antitrust authority (AA) by revealing crucial information about the existence of the cartel that is needed for a successful conviction by penal courts.
Information may be revealed ex-ante before an investigation conducted by the AA starts, or ex-post during an ongoing investigation. Leniency programs are based upon the economic principle that …rms, who broke the antitrust law, might report their illegal activities if given proper incentives to do so and, if e¤ective, might dissolve existing cartels or, even better, a priori deter such illegal activities. In the US, antitrust policy speci…es (reduced) …nes that are related to the cartel's net gain, and caught cartel members face additional liabilities in the form of private law suites by harmed customers. The EC legislation has penalty schemes for conviction and leniency that are proportional to the cartel's gain. Even though it is legally possible within many EU countries, private lawsuits are almost absent.
Despite a large literature on the theory of enforcement against individual illegal behavior, see e.g. Polinsky and Shavell (2000) , the theory of antitrust policy is still in its infancy when it comes to enforcing market competition with little attention to its implementation, see e.g. Rey (2003) and Spagnolo (2007) . Illegal anti-competitive behavior is a much more complicated subject since it typically is a concerted illegal action performed within an ongoing relationship over time, called a cartel. The theory of antitrust policy must therefore be conducted in a dynamic setting. The early literature deals with cartel stability in the absence of policy intervention, often modelled as a repeated game as in e.g. Abreu et al. (1986) and Green and Porter (1984) . Recently, optimal implementation of antitrust policy for cartel enforcement has been analyzed in e.g. Motta and Polo (2003) , Spagnolo (2004 Spagnolo ( , 2007 , Harrington (2004 Harrington ( , 2005 , Hinloopen (2003 Hinloopen ( , 2006 , Motchenkova (2004) , Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) and Harrington and Chen (2006) .
The seminal paper on optimal revelation schemes as part of antitrust policy is Motta and Polo (2003) , who study, loosely speaking, a Stackelberg game in which the AA …rst chooses once and for all its antitrust policy followed by the competition phase in which the …rms compete among each other, which is modelled as an in…nitely-repeated oligopoly game. Market competition is restricted to a discrete set of three prices that captures the three most important pro…t levels: The pro…t under perfect competition, under the cartel and the pro…t of optimally cheating on the cartel price. In each period, …rms decide whether to reveal information about their misconduct. The cartel adopts grim-trigger strategies in which cheating on the cartel by either setting a di¤erent price or applying for leniency triggers competitive behavior forever, while the cartel continues its illegal business as usual each time it is caught by the AA. Under the optimal antitrust policy, introduction of ex-post leniency programs will increase the chance of the cartel being captured, but ex-ante leniency programs that grant reduced …nes are ine¤ective. As later shown in Spagnolo (2004) and Rey (2003) , e¤ective ex-ante leniency programs require substantial rewards, i.e., pay self-reporting …rms. Harrington and Chen (2006) incorporate ex-ante leniency programs into a special case of the framework in Harrington (2004 and 2005) to augment traditional antitrust policy in an environment where cartels arouse suspicions. In such environment, cartels also need to manage suspicions, modeled as if the cartel keeps in mind an endogenous detection probability. This probability is modelled as a function of the cartel's price setting, where price is a continuous variable. The focus is on an exogenous antitrust policy in order to study the cartel's optimal reaction on the pro…t-maximizing cartel price, which means that the price setting by the cartel has become an endogenous decision. This model can be regarded as the competition phase in Motta and Polo (2003) in a very general setting. The cartel adopts grim-trigger strategies that are similar to those in Motta and Polo (2003) , but with the difference that the cartel terminates its illegal business after being caught once by the AA. So, the cartel culture of whether to continue the cartel after being caught di¤ers between Motta and Polo (2003) and Harrington and Chen (2006) . In the last reference, the detection prob-ability also depends upon past prices and collusive behavior induces a cumulative liability in the form of …xed …nes and private law suites. These two features introduce state variables into the model and this makes the equilibrium nontractable. The analysis, therefore, has to resort to simulations of price paths. Nevertheless, the model admits a steady-state pro…t-maximizing cartel price that lies above the competitive price, and this price is independent of the leniency program meaning such program is ine¤ective.
The foci of our paper are also detection probabilities and penalty schemes that are sensitive to the cartel's pricing behavior within a generalized repeated-game version of Harrington and Chen (2006) . Our model generalizes Motta and Polo (2003) by including endogenous cartel behavior, the presence of suspicions, the notion of cartel culture 1 , and a general class of exogenous antitrust policies with proportional penalty schemes that include the possibility of an e¤ective reward. Several aspects of the model in Harrington and Chen (2006) are also generalized, namely a general oligopoly model instead of Bertrand oligopoly, general penalty schemes with …ne reductions that include rewards, and the introduction of cartel culture. In fact, our notion of cartel culture uni…es the opposite assumptions in Motta and Polo (2003) and Harrington and Chen (2006) with respect to this parameter. Therefore, our model bridges the rudimentary market competition phase in Motta and Polo (2003) with the general approach in Harrington and Chen (2006) .
An innovative but unconventional aspect of our model is that we analyze the maximal cartel price, i.e., the largest cartel price for which the equilibrium conditions for sustainability hold, instead of the standard approach of pro…t maximization by the cartel. There are several reasons why the maximal cartel price is interesting: First, experimental economics has established that often economic agents behave di¤erently from standard microeconomic theory. This hints at that cartel members may also behave di¤erent from pro…t maximization.
Indeed, there is empirical evidence in support of Baumol's hypothesis that managers of large 1 Cartel culture is related to the probability that the cartel resumes business as usual after each conviction by the antitrust authorities. Bosch and Eckard (1991) report that 14 per cent of 1300 …rms are recidivist. This implies, on average, a cartel culture of :86 in our model. corporations seek to maximize sales rather than pro…ts, see e.g. Baumol (1958) and McGuire et al. (1962) . As an alternative, the sustainability of cartel behavior o¤ers a more robust criterion that does not depend on the cartel's objective. Furthermore, the characterization of society's maximal damage through the maximal cartel price can be regarded as a worst-case scenario for society's unawareness about the cartel's objective. Second, under traditional antitrust regulation, we report that the cartel's value function may fail to be monotonically increasing and concave in the cartel price for all parameter values. This poses a technical problem in characterizing the pro…t-maximizing cartel price. We show that the maximal cartel price does not have this drawback. Third, there is a large subclass of parameter values for which the equilibrium conditions are binding under both the pro…t-maximizing cartel price and the maximal cartel price and, hence, both cartel prices coincide. This includes the subclass of parameter values for which the value function is monotonic.
Our analysis shows that a direct approach to characterize the maximal cartel price based upon inverting the (possibly non-monotonic) value function is not applicable. To overcome this technical issue, our characterization is based upon analyzing properties of the threshold level for the discount factor as a function of price and, then, translate these properties into the maximal cartel price as a function of the discount factor. This novel approach turns out to be very fruitful to characterize the maximal cartel price. This price is increasing in the discount factor, and it decreases in the cartel culture parameter and in the parameters characterizing penalty schemes (the coe¢ cients of proportional …nes and detection probabilities).
For a general class of ex-ante leniency programs, we show that such programs cannot be e¤ective without rewards. We also characterize the minimal e¤ective reward that is needed to make ex-ante leniency programs e¤ective and break the cartel. The minimal e¤ective reward critically depends upon the traditional antitrust policy employed. With respect to analyzing leniency programs, we also make a technical but useful remark in checking and deriving equilibrium strategies, application of the one-stage-deviation principle implies that one does not need to investigate simultaneously a deviation in the price setting stage and the revelation stage.
Our characterization of the maximal cartel price under traditional antitrust policy complements the results in Harrington (2004 and 2005) . In the latter references, it is shown that the pro…t-maximizing cartel price has non-binding equilibrium conditions for su¢ ciently large discount factors and that it is strictly decreasing in the discount factor. Combined with our results, monotonicity of the pro…t-maximizing cartel price fails for the entire range of discount factors, which we illustrate by means of a robust example. In this example, the pro…t-maximizing cartel price also underestimates by far the maximal damage to society whenever the equilibrium conditions are non-binding. Finally, our results also hint at that the ine¤ectiveness of ex-ante leniency programs without rewards, as reported in Harrington and Chen (2006) for very large discount factors, generalizes to all discount factors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the benchmark model where we derive maximal cartel price in the absence of any regulation. In section 3 we analyze the impact of traditional tools of antitrust enforcement on maximal sustainable cartel price and relate it to the characteristics of the industry. In section 4 we compare the e¤ectiveness of antitrust enforcement supplemented by leniency programs to the results of the previous section. Section 5 concludes the analysis and discusses the policy recommendations.
The Benchmark Model
Consider an oligopoly market where n 2 …rms compete over in…nitely many periods.
Assume that all …rms have a common discount factor 2 (0; 1) per period. 
A novelty is that we de…ne (p) as the relative size of the cartel pro…t to the pro…t under best unilateral deviation. More speci…cally,
Since the function ( ) might be discontinuous at p = p N , as Example 2 illustrates, we introduce 3 = lim
To our analysis, two sectors with the same ( ) function will be treated as identical. Note that ( ) is the ratio of individual …rm's pro…t from the cartel to the pro…t from unilateral optimal deviation against the cartel. This means that higher ( ), the less incentives each cartel member has to deviate, and the more stable the cartel is. Consequently, ( ) represents the degree of incentives to deviate or degree of cartel stability in the sector. We assume that repeated game with the static model described above as the stage game. Under a leniency program, however, the model becomes an in…nitely-repeated sequential game since …rms may self-report to the AA. Throughout this paper, we focus on a class of modi…ed grim-trigger strategies to sustain cartel price p > p N in which any deviation leads to the repetition of the perfectly competitive equilibrium outcome in every period thereafter. The underlying rationale is that cartels are based upon trust and, by the reciprocal nature of humans, all trust is gone after someone cheats.
In this paper, the equilibrium concept is subgame perfect equilibrium. In verifying equilibrium conditions, we apply the one-stage-deviation principle, see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991 
Since (p) is non-increasing in p, (1) implies that the threshold for is non-decreasing in the cartel price p 2 p N ; p M , and it is equivalent to p max p : p 2 1 (1 ) . Because p N satis…es (1) for all 2 (0; 1), we have p N max p : p 2 1 (1 ) . The socially worst outcome is the maximal cartel price supported by the grim-trigger strategy pro…les;
The maximal cartel price p C is well de…ned since (1) induces a closed subinterval (possibly
Due the monotonicity of (p), the pro…t of each cartel member is also maximized at the maximal cartel price p C among all subgame perfect equilibria supported by grim-trigger strategy pro…les. However, as we will see later, this may not be the case under an antitrust regulation with or without a leniency program.
Now we explain how we characterize the maximal cartel price p C later on. A direct approach would be to solve (1) for p as a function of all parameters, which requires the inverse function 1 (1 ). In Section 3 and 4, however, the function of p that needs to be inverted becomes very complicated and may even lack monotonicity properties. Instead, our characterization is based upon analyzing properties of the threshold level for as a function
and then, translate these properties to the maximal cartel price as a function of in the ( ; p)-plane. This indirect approach turns out to be very fruitful, as the following result for the benchmark demonstrates.
Proposition 1 In the absence of any antitrust regulation, the maximal cartel price p C is non-decreasing in 2 (0; 1), and (2) for must also satisfy (2) for 0 . Hence, p C must be nondecreasing in 2 (0; 1). If < 1 , then (2) will be violated for all p > p N , and hence
We will treat the maximal cartel price p C in the absence of any antitrust regulation as the benchmark when evaluating the e¤ectiveness of an antitrust regulation in Section 3 and a leniency program in Section 4. Unlike some of the early work, we do not restrict our analysis to the issue whether the monopoly price can be supported by the cartel. Although an antitrust regulation may not be e¤ective in preventing the cartel from the monopoly price, we are interested in its relative e¤ectiveness comparing with the case without any antitrust regulation.
In economic applications, one can resort to a simple numerical implementation of our approach: Numerically calculate (p) = 1 (p) and, then, by reversing the dependence, plot the numerical values in the ( ; p)-space for 2 [1 ; 1 ). In some cases, such as Example 2 and 3, closed-form solutions for the inverse function 1 (1 ) can be derived.
Example 2 Consider a homogeneous Bertrand oligopoly model with linear demand y = 2 p and 0 marginal costs. Note that p N = 0 and p
, each of the n …rms may deviate by slightly undercutting the others to obtain the full cartel pro…t, i.e.,
. Proposition 1 then implies that
Example 3 Consider a (symmetric) heterogenous Bertrand duopoly model. For i 6 = j, the demand function faced by …rm i is given by
where
2 is the …xed cost that normalizes the model so that p N = 0 at the static Nash equilibrium price
. To …nd the maximal collusive price,
, we have
Observe that
By L'Hôpital's rule, it is easy to check that = 1,
Since = 1 and (p) is strictly decreasing in p, we have that p C > p N for all > 0 and p C is strictly increasing in 2 (0; 1 ). More speci…cally, we have
; for 2 (0; 1 );
for 2 [1 ; 1);
The following …gure illustrates p C as a function of 2 (0; 1) for a = 2 and b = 1.
3 Antitrust Enforcement
In this section, we examine the impact of traditional antitrust policy. The AA investigates the market outcome in every period with certain probability and implements an antitrust policy. Upon being caught, violators will be …ned. Given p 2 [p N ; p M ], the AA will …nd the …rms guilty of collusion with probability (p) 2 [0; 1). We assume that (p N ) = 0, and (p)
is a non-decreasing di¤erentiable function. As in Rey (2003) , hard evidence disappears after one period meaning that if the …rms are found guilty of sustaining cartel price p 2 (p
every …rm will have to pay a one-time …ne k(p) (p), where k(p) is a non-decreasing continuous
The function ( ) re ‡ects that a higher cartel price might invoke more attention from the AA about cartel abuse and make detection more likely. Any cartel will take the negative e¤ects of its cartel price into account when deciding upon the price.
We model the AA as a passive player in this model, while …rms are the active players.
The detection probability ( ) is limited by the resources of the authority, and the …ne schedule k( ) is limited by legislation. and 2 k (p) 3. These facts imply 7 Technically speaking, we exclude …xed …nes
However, for every F > 0, there exists a continuous approximation that can be made arbitrarily to the discontinuous function and that also satis…es our assumptions. Formally, for every F > 0 and " > 0, there exists a continuous approximation 
and restrict the set of feasible prices p 2 p N ; p M to the discrete set p N , p M and the optimal deviation against p M . 9 The repeated-game version of the model in Harrington (2004) can be obtained as follows: the potential liability X t at period t is equal to, in our terminology, 0
where F > 0 is a …xed …ne and k (p) (p) represents each …rm's liability of private lawsuits. Our detection probability only depends upon the current price and is independent upon the previous one.
10 According to the sentencing guidelines in most European countries, …nes are bounded by either a …xed monetary amount or approximately 10% of overall annual turnover of the …rm. In the US, however, there is no legal upper bound.
11 The quote from OECD (2002) says: "It is widely agreed that an e¤ective sanction against a cartel should take into account not only the amount of gain realized by the cartel but also the probability that any given cartel will be detected and prosecuted. Because not all cartels are detected, the …nancial sanction against one that is detected should exceed the gain actually realized by the cartel. Some experts believe that as few as one in six or seven cartels are detected and prosecuted, implying a multiple of at least six. A multiple of three is more commonly cited, however." In the Annex B of OECD (2002), a range of …nes between two and three times the illegal pro…ts is reported. The report also mentions countries with a …xed …ne independent of the illegal gains. Both systems are used in OECD countries at the moment.
an expected penalty roughly between 30% to 50% of illegal gains or monopoly pro…ts, or
. Therefore, the AA may not be able to deter these violations. In this paper, we simply assume that 0 (p) k (p) < 1 for all p 2 p N ; p M . This less restrictive assumption implies that the expected …ne at any price above the competitive price is lower than the (per period) cartel pro…t and, therefore, any cartel is tempted to set its price above the competitive price.
An important aspect in assessing the e¤ectiveness of the antitrust regulation is how the cartel members react to detection. In some cases, being caught once is su¢ cient to deter the cartel members from continuing any such illegal activity in the future. In other cases, the economic sector is notorious for its persistent cartel activities despite many convictions.
Persistence means members pay the …nes and continue (illegal) business as usual. Since antitrust regulation is involved with all sectors in the economy, the cartel culture within each sector plays an important role in evaluating the e¤ectiveness of the antitrust policy. To allow for a wide range of cartel behavior or to accommodate these di¤erences across sectors, we introduce a cartel culture parameter. Let 2 [0; 1] be the probability that the …rms will behave competitively after each time the cartel is detected. To put it di¤erently, the cartel culture parameter is interpreted as the probability that the cartel stops its activities after each detection. A high degree of persistence with renewed cartel activity for almost sure is associated with a value of close to 0. Similar, a value of = 1 means the sector would become competitive after the cartel being detected. 12 Motta and Polo (2003) assume detection does not dissolve the cartel, i.e., the cartel culture = 0, and Harrington (2004) assumes detection dissolves the cartel, i.e., the cartel culture = 1. Our cartel-culture parameter captures both models.
Let V (p) be the present value of a cartel member's expected pro…t if the cartel sets price p 2 p N ; p M in every period. This present value for each cartel member consists of the 12 The parameter can be estimated from time series for a particular industry that specify the date of inspection by the authorities and the outcome in terms of whether the …rms were found guilty. The fraction of times a convicted cartel was found guilty again at the next investigation serves as a proxy for . current illegal gains (p) from the cartel, the expected …ne (p) k (p) (p), the expected continuation pro…t of a renewed cartel after detection (p) (1 ) V (p), and the expected continuation pro…t of not being detected (1 (p)) V (p);
Solving for V (p) yields that
Note that V p
This re ‡ects that the possibility of being detected and …ned reduces the expected cartel gains. This implies that an antitrust regulation reduces the expected gains from any cartel compared to the benchmark case. Although (p) is assumed to be monotonically increasing in p, V (p) may not be monotonic in p since the fraction in (3) is non-increasing and (p)
To simplify veri…cation of the …rst statement, denote The cartel would become unpro…table, independent of its cartel culture 2 [0; 1], if the AA could set its policy (p) k (p) > 1, i.e., the expected …ne is above 100% of illegal gains. As we have discussed, the current practice within the OECD countries indicates that
is at most 50%. Inspection of (3) also shows that cartel pro…t is decreasing with respect to its culture parameter (higher means less persistence). How this a¤ects antitrust policy will be dealt with later.
Moreover, the cartel has its own destabilizing forces working from within. These destabilizing forces are the incentives of individual cartel members to cheat on the cartel's implicit agreement. In order to express these incentives, it is necessary that we describe what happens within the cartel after some of its members cheat. As motivated in Section 2, cartel members adopt the following modi…ed grim-trigger strategy pro…le to sustain a cartel price of p > p N :
1. Firms continue to set a price p > 0 with probability 1 every time the AA detects their fraud (and with probability behave competitively ever after).
2. Any deviation by some cartel members leads to the perfectly competitive equilibrium p N in every period ever after.
This modi…ed grim-trigger strategy pro…le assumes that the trust is gone forever when some members cheat.
Given such an implicit cartel agreement, the pro…t from a unilateral deviation is equal to the short term gain of opt (p) in the current period, followed the normalized pro…t from the competitive equilibrium forever. 13 In terms of Abreu et al. (1986) , individual deviations are punished by the symmetric stationary SPE p N . Consequently, the necessary and su¢ cient condition to support a cartel price
which implies that (5) generalizes the benchmark model of absence of any regulation discussed in section 2.
Before continuing the economic analysis, we …rst establish the following properties of the function ( ) as de…ned in (5).
Lemma 4 (p) is non-decreasing in p and increasing when either
Moreover, (p) is increasing in , k (p) and (p) and decreasing in .
Proof. Taking derivative of (p) with respect to p, we have
due to our assumptions on (p) and k(p). In addition, when either
The e¤ects of , and k (p) are obvious.
Lemma 4 implies that the right-hand side of (5) increases when increases. Hence, a lower would weaken (5). This implies that the more persistent the collusion is (i.e., lower ), the easier it is to sustain a cartel price. Similar, the right-hand side of (5) is decreasing in , meaning that an increase in would relax (5). As the …rms care more about future, it becomes easier to sustain the same cartel price. Also an overall increase in detection probabilities (p) or …nes k (p) would make collusion harder to sustain.
The variable of interest is the maximal cartel price. Higher cartel prices put an upward pressure on the right-hand side of (5). This reduces the sustainability of p and only industries with relative high values of (p) close to 1 might withstand this pressure, meaning the short-term gains of blowing up the cartel must be relatively close to the cartel pro…t (p). Since the weak monotonicity properties of (p) (non-decreasing) and (p) (non- 
where superscript R refers to the presence of antitrust regulation. Program (6) Comparing (2) and (6), our next result shows that antitrust regulation may lower the maximal cartel price in general.
Proposition 5 For all parameter values, we have p
Proof. By Lemma 4 and (p N ) = 1 , we have (p) 1 . In other words, any p that satis…es (5) must also satis…es (1), which concludes the proof.
To be more speci…c, similar to Proposition 1, we now derive the thresholds on the discount factor for di¤erent values of p R . Note that (5) can be rewritten as 
The last inequality is strict when
The e¤ect of k (p) is obvious.
Proposition 7 Under antitrust regulation, the maximal cartel price p R is non-decreasing in 2 (0; 1) and non-increasing in 2 [0; 1]. Furthermore, we have
An overall increase in detection (p) or k (p) shifts (p M ) and the entire curve to the right.
Proof. Lemma 4 and monotonicity of (p) imply that p R is non-decreasing in and nonincreasing in . Note that (p N ) = 0 and lim "!0 + (p N + ") = 1 . When 2 (0; 1 );
Clearly, inequality (7) is more restrictive than (1) implying that introduction of antitrust regulation with positive probability of being caught restricts the set of discount factors for which collusion can be sustained for every possible price p 2 (p N ; p M ]. This implies that cartel stability is reduced compared to benchmark case. Moreover, the fact that (p) is non-decreasing in p implies that the antitrust policy discussed in this section might be more e¤ective for more grave violations (i.e. collusion on higher prices).
Proposition 7 also implies that
Depending on the discount factor , Propositions 1, 7, and 5 imply the following results:
When (p M ) < 1, the antitrust policy is not e¤ective to deter the cartel from setting its monopoly price. In particular, antitrust enforcement would not be able to reduce the cartel price below the monopoly level (p
This implies that necessary and su¢ cient condition for
(p M ) < 1 requires that condition (5) for cartel stability is broken at = 1, i.e.,
This inequality can be numerically veri…ed in applications, it is written to separate the industry characteristics ( ; (p)) from the policy instruments ( (p) ; k (p)).
Given a particular antitrust policy, it is interesting to investigate whether this policy can eradicate the monopoly price for all cartel cultures. Solving condition (8) for yields
To destabilize cartels for all possible cartel cultures 2 [0; 1], the right-hand side must be negative, i.e., (p M )k(p M ) > 1. Hence, under any cartel policy that satis…es condition
, industries that are notorious for persistent cartel behavior ( close to 0) cannot be eradicated by the antitrust policy unless one is willing to adopt a policy that fully takes away the illegal gains (i.e.
Another important conclusion is related to the impact of parameter on sustainability of the monopoly price. Recall, that ( ) can be viewed as a ratio of individual illegal gains from cartel formation to pro…ts from unilateral optimal deviation against the cartel. This implies that ( ) also relates to particular characteristics of a sector, such as incentives to deviate or degree of cartel stability in the sector. Hence, conditions of the above proposition imply that in sectors were the degree of cartel stability is higher ( ( ) closer to 1), the likelihood of sustaining society's worst price p M also increases, since @ =@ < 0. So that in these sectors, we should expect that antitrust policy will be less e¤ective compared to the sectors with lower ( ).
The main message of analysis in this section is a mixed blessing for antitrust regulation.
On the one hand, proposition 7 identi…es non-empty sets of parameter values for which antitrust regulation is e¤ective in reducing the maximal price the cartel can sustain, i.e.,
On the other hand, as long as the authority or the legal system obeys condition (8), there always will remain a large non-empty set of parameter values for which p R = p M , meaning the antitrust policy is totally ine¤ective on this set.
The following example illustrates the issues discussed in this section.
Example 8 Reconsider the homogeneous Bertrand oligopoly of Example 2. Suppose that (p) = p and k (p) = k, where k < 1. Then, (6) becomes
Note that p = 0 is feasible in the quadratic constraint if and only if 1 1 n . The constraint can be rewritten as
which is the solution to the problem whenever it is between 0 and 1. The right hand side is increasing in . To summarize, we have
Depending on the values of the parameters, p R may not be equal to p M = 1 for all 2 (0; 1), such as if (n + k) > 1. Since k < 1, this condition can hold only when n is su¢ ciently large. For sectors with a small number of …rms and a cartel culture parameter that is su¢ ciently close to 0, the monopoly price will not be eradicated by the antitrust regulation in this example. We can also see how each parameter value a¤ects the maximal cartel price under the antitrust policy. Both possible cases for the curve of maximal prices p R are illustrated by the following …gure, where the vertical dotted line at = 1 1 n represents the discontinuous jump in p N = 0 to p M = 1 under the benchmark case in Example 2.
We conclude this example, by relating our results to Harrington (2004 and 2005) . By 
Leniency Programs
As we have shown, traditional antitrust policy alone may not be e¤ective to eradicate all cartel prices. One revision of antitrust policy that is considered recently in most of the EU countries and in the US is what is often referred to as a leniency program. 15 The essence of such program is that cartel members can self-report their misbehavior to the AA and that in return self-reporting …rms have to pay less severe penalties. According to the current leniency programs in Europe, a self-reporting …rm will receive a reduced …ne that depends on how many other …rms have self reported already. The US can be seen as an extreme variant of the EC system in which the …rst self-reporting …rm is fully exempted and all subsequent self-reporting …rms will have to pay the full …ne. In this section, we examine antitrust policies with ex-ante leniency programs and study its impact on the maximal cartel price. We will characterize the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which introducing leniency programs as part of antitrust policy is e¤ective. This implies that ex-ante leniency programs are not by its mere presence e¤ective.
We incorporate a simpli…ed ex-ante leniency program into the model as follows. In every period, …rms …rst choose their cartel price simultaneously as before. Upon a cartel being formed, i.e., all choose p 2 p N ; p M and cartel pro…ts are realized, …rms then independently and simultaneously choose whether to self-report to the AA before any investigation begins.
If at least one …rm self-reports, all cartel members are convicted and …ned. If no …rm selfreports, the authority investigates the industry with probability ( ) as in Section 3. The stage game in any period is a two-stage game, hence the repeated game model is an in…nitely repeated sequential game, see e.g. Wen (2002) . As in Rey (2003), we assume the hard case of public self-reporting meaning that if someone reveals information, this cannot be kept secret and all other cartel members immediately know this.
There are two situations that are particularly important to our later analysis. If none of the …rms self-reports, then the expected pro…t to a …rm during a period is simply equal
. However, if a …rm self-reports while none of the other …rms selfreports, the pro…t to the (only) self-reporting …rm is (p) (p) (p) in the period, where (p) (p) is the reduced …ne that the …rst self-reporting …rm has to pay. Assume that
Note that it is possible that (p) < 0, meaning a self-reporting …rm will be rewarded. The absence of a leniency program can be treated as a special case by setting The issue of multiple self-reporting …rms has been much discussed in the literature, see e.g. Spagnolo (2007) and Motchenkova (2004) , because the largest …ne reduction in many countries applies only to the …rst self-reporting …rm and all other …rms would pay higher …nes up to the full …ne. Given that the decisions to self-report are taken simultaneously, our model cannot capture the "…rst" self-reporting …rm. Since we study the subgame perfect equilibrium in which no …rm will self-report along the equilibrium outcome path, it is not necessary to specify the expected pro…ts in case more than a single …rm unilaterally deviates by self-reporting. So, multiple self-reporting …rms are not a concern in our analysis of the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which no …rm will self-report along the equilibrium outcome path, since only unilateral decision matters.
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Since the objective of a leniency program is to provide an incentive for the individual …rm to self-report, such policy adds a second destabilizing force to the cartel. As in the previous sections, we characterize the maximal cartel price sustainable by the following modi…ed grim-trigger strategy pro…le:
1. Firms continue to set a price p > p N with probability 1 every time after the AA detects their fraud (and with probability behave competitively thereafter).
2. Any deviation by one of the cartel members (either setting a lower price or selfreporting) leads to the perfectly competitive equilibrium in every period thereafter.
As before, this modi…ed grim-trigger strategy pro…le assumes that the trust is gone forever when a cartel member either undercuts the cartel price or self-reports. Given the implicit cartel agreement, the expected pro…ts of sustaining the cartel price p are equal to V (p) in (3) for the same reason. In this modi…ed grim-trigger strategies, there are two types of unilateral one-stage deviations: undercut the cartel price and self-report to the AA. Each type of such deviation can be analyzed independently from the other. Inequality (5) is still the necessary and su¢ cient condition under which no cartel member would undercut the cartel price.
The expected continuation pro…t of the one-stage deviation by self-reporting consists of paying the reduced …ne (p) (p) in the current period followed by the continuation pro…ts from the competitive equilibrium p N forever after due to the breakdown of trust. Therefore, a …rm will not self-report if and only if
which simpli…es to
Condition (9) implies that, in order to break the silence of no self-reporting, the AA should choose a …ne reduction (p) k (p) that is su¢ ciently low. More speci…cally, the leniency program fails to be e¤ective if (p) 1, i.e., the reduced …ne should never be more than the …rm's pro…t in a single period. When (p) < 1, which is relevant for su¢ ciently large and su¢ ciently low , the AA would have to compensate the self-reporting …rm for voluntarily giving up its future expected rents from staying in the cartel, i.e., (p) must be negative.
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Hence, from here on we only consider the case of (p) < 1 and investigate whether the leniency program is e¤ective. Accordingly, (9) can be rewritten as
Under a leniency program, the maximal cartel price is given by
p; s.t. (5) and (10),
where superscript L refers to the presence of the leniency program. In Section 3, we have shown that (5) The analysis thus far implies the following result:
Proposition 9 Under antitrust regulation with a leniency program, we have
We illustrate this result for the case p L =p < p R under constant ( ) and ( ) functions by the following …gure.
Recall that (4) is equivalent to (p). Similarly, constraint (9) is equivalent to
Note that (p N ) = 0 and (p) is a non-decreasing and continuous function of p 2 (p
The following result characterizes the maximal cartel price as a function of the discount factor .
Proposition 10 The maximal cartel price p L is non-decreasing in 2 (0; 1) and nonincreasing in 2 (0; 1). Furthermore, we have
Proof. Observe that ( ) is decreasing in 2 (0; 1) and increasing in 2 (0; 1). Increasing and/or decreasing will relax both (4) and (10). Therefore, p L is non-decreasing in 2 (0; 1) and non-increasing in 2 (0; 1). (4) and (10) 
Combining Proposition 7 and 9, we obtain
The policy relevant question is then whether such a leniency program is e¤ective to upset the cartel price p 2 p N ; p M . Suppose that without the leniency program, it is possible to sustain a cartel price p 2 p N ; p R meaning (p) (p) holds. The leniency program is e¤ective to upset the cartel price p if and only if (10) fails at p. Accordingly,
Before discussing (13), we …rst state the following result.
Lemma 11 The upper bound 1
is non-decreasing in p and increasing in p if either
is increasing in , k (p) and (p) and decreasing in .
Proof. All results follow immediately from Lemma 4 after observing that 1 1 responds similar to changes in variables and parameters as .
The upper bound (13) on (p) has several interesting and important implications. First, it implies that in order for the ex-ante leniency program to be e¤ective, the …rst self-reporting …rm needs to be rewarded as (p) < 0. This result is quite intuitive. Since a …rm's future expected cartel pro…t is positive (i.e. higher than the competitive pro…ts), in order to induce a …rm to self-report, this …rm will have to be compensated for foregoing its positive future expected pro…t. Since the current leniency programs in the OECD countries all feature ( ) 0 , the inevitable conclusion is that the ex-ante part of these programs is ine¤ective.
Second, (13) provides an upper bound on (p) that depends only upon (p) and not on (p). Therefore, this bound is indirectly related to the current antitrust regulation and some speci…c industry characteristics, like and , but is independent of the industry characteristic (p), which may be the most di¢ cult to estimate from empirical data.
Third, by the monotonicity of Lemma 11, it is easy to design an e¤ective constant ex-ante leniency program such that (13) holds for all p 2 p N ; p R :
Although constant leniency program can be easily implemented in guidelines, it has the drawback of o¤ering too much rewards for all p > p N .
Fourth, legal and economic principles often di¤er and this is also the case for leniency programs. Since e¤ective programs require rewards, this obviously violates the "crime should not pay" principle. Lemma 11, however, o¤ers some scope for implementing reward schemes that reward less the more severe violations. This indicates a limited degree of moral or juridical reasons that can be allowed in e¤ective ex-ante leniency programs. This result holds independently of the industry characteristics (p), cartel culture , the discount factor , and for any antitrust regulation as speci…ed in Section 3.
Another economic principle is to keep the e¤ective reward ( ) as low as possible. Denote the minimal e¤ective reward as^ (p), then after substituting (5) into (13), we obtain
By de…nition, the minimal e¤ective reward^ (p) has the properties stated in Lemma 11. The fact that cartels that set higher prices arouse more suspicions makes them more vulnerable to be uncovered. This implies a positive e¤ect on the expected penalty and a negative e¤ect on the expected time of enjoying the bene…ts from the cartel before the …rst conviction.
Lower expected net bene…ts makes coming forward more attractive and, since the minimal e¤ective reward is non-decreasing, requires a lower minimal e¤ective reward. So, the presence of suspicions has a dampening e¤ect on the minimal e¤ective reward. Consequently, cartels that set low prices and by doing so arouse less suspicions are the most costly to terminate through leniency.
We now summarize our main …ndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 12 There always exists an e¤ective ex-ante leniency program (p) that satis- Below we provide several remarks with respect to policy intervention and explain the main policy implications that follow from our results. First, it is important to realize that the minimal e¤ective reward^ ( ) critically depends upon the existing traditional antitrust policy. So, changing the latter always has repercussions on the minimal reward ex-ante e¤ective leniency program. Therefore, future reforms of the antitrust policy should consider simultaneously the traditional antitrust policy and the ex-ante leniency program. Second, the minimal e¤ective reward has to be tailor-made to each industry or economic sector.
Therefore, an one-size-…ts-all ex-ante leniency program that by de…nition cannot incorporate industry characteristics and sector-dependent antitrust regulation inevitably either fails the minimal reward property in (14), or fails to be e¤ective for some sectors and some cartel prices. In particular, constant ex-ante leniency programs for all sectors will involve too much rewarding …rms at some cartel prices for some sectors and, where it remains ine¤ective, will o¤er too little incentives to come forward in other sectors. Third, since cartels that set low prices arouse little suspicions these cartels are the most costly to upset through tailor-made minimal-reward leniency programs. Such cartels, however, are also the cartels that cause the least damage to society. The trade-o¤ between eliminating low-price cartels and the high costs through minimal rewards lies outside the scope of the current paper, but is certainly relevant for practice.
Our result that ex-ante leniency programs are ine¤ective generalizes the …ndings reported in Motta and Polo (2003) , Spagnolo (2004) and Rey (2003) for very speci…c settings. In the last reference, it is also shown that the minimal e¤ective reward is unbounded if goes to 1. Taking this limit for^ (:) evaluated at arbitrary p in (p N ; p M ] shows that this limit is bounded for all > 0 and that it is only unbounded for the boundary case = 0, which is the case analyzed in Rey (2003) . Our results also hint at that the ine¤ectiveness of exante leniency programs without rewards reported in Harrington and Chen (2006) for the pro…t-maximizing cartel price under very large discount factors generalizes to a wider class of di¤erent objective functions for the cartel and all discount factors.
We now conclude this section by revisiting our example of the homogenous Bertrand oligopoly, which is also studied in Harrington and Chen (2006) .
Example 13 Reconsider Example 8. Under antitrust regulation (p) = p and k (p) = k, where 0 < k < 1, we …rst note that (p) satis…es (13) 
Since 0 (p) = > 0, this function is strictly increasing in p. The following …gure plots several minimal reward leniency programs^ (p) for = 0:2, k = 3, = 0:5 and = 0:7, = 0:8 and = 0:9. The higher , the larger the size of the minimal e¤ective reward (in absolute value) needs to be. This …gure illustrates that^ (p) is increasing in p, as asserted. When the actual leniency
(in this last …gure, which is equivalent to (1 (p)) 1 intersects (p) at most once atp).
As the curve (p) shifts downwards, i.e., the reward for all p 2 (p 
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we explore a general in…nitely-repeated game framework for the analysis of antitrust violations in the presence of both traditional antitrust policies and ex-ante leniency programs. This framework allows for the simultaneous analysis of two important decisions cartel members face in the presence of leniency programs: decisions to deviate from the cartel price and decisions to self-report to the authorities. A novel concept is the maximal cartel price that re ‡ects society's worst cartel price among those cartel prices that are sustainable, which endogenizes the cartel formation decision and its pricing strategy. The generality of our framework is also re ‡ected in allowing for endogenous detection probabilities and penalty schemes that are each non-decreasing in the cartel price. 20 As a consequence, the expected punishment is also endogenous. Our framework allows to integrate decisions about self-reporting, cartel formation and its pricing strategy (maximal cartel price) and relate these to the type and structure of the industry including its cartel culture parameter.
Our analysis makes several contributions to the literature: A general technique to characterize and also to separate the e¤ects of traditional antitrust enforcement and ex-ante leniency programs on the maximal cartel price. We also clarify that an important implication of the one-stage-deviation principle is that one can restrict any equilibrium analysis to either price deviations or deviations considering self-reporting, but it is unnecessary to consider both simultaneously.
In this framework, we identify the su¢ cient and necessary conditions for which antitrust regulation is e¤ective in reducing the maximal cartel price. We conclude that an antitrust policy is less e¤ective in sectors where the degree of cartel stability is higher or where the sector's cartel culture to continue business as usual is more prominent. Confronting our theoretical results with stylized facts from currently employed antitrust policies in OECD countries imply that these policies are ine¤ective.
An e¤ective ex-ante leniency program that eradicates all cartel prices always exists.
Such leniency program, however, necessarily involves rewards. Furthermore, many reward schemes, including constant schemes, imply either too much or too little rewarding at some cartel prices. Since current leniency programs apply uniformly over all sectors, over/under rewarding will also di¤er across sectors. This implies that sector-speci…c minimal e¤ective reward schemes would be the best solution in terms of o¤ering precisely the amount of money to induce self-reporting.
The main results also have several policy implications. First, e¤ectiveness of antitrust regulation and ex-ante leniency programs depends upon industry characteristics, such as industry or product life-cycle, sector's cartel culture, or the type of competition. Second, a minimal-reward leniency program has to be tailor made to each industry or economic sector instead of an one-size-…ts-all leniency program. The reason is that an one-size-…ts-all program may involve too much rewarding …rms at some cartel prices in some economic sectors and may o¤er too little incentives to come forward in other sectors. Third, according to Rey (2003) , AAs often do not observe relevant information in the absence of an audit. The presence of suspicions could be a reason for the authorities to develop antenna's for picking up such signals and develop …lters to sift false rumors from true ones prior to an investigation. We do not investigate the costs and bene…ts of developing such policy instrument, but our analysis shows that if the authorities can transform suspicions into an e¤ective policy instrument it will have a dampening e¤ect on the maximal cartel price.
Our analysis also reveals that the pro…t-maximizing cartel price in Harrington (2004 and 2005) may underestimate the maximal damage to society whenever the equilibrium conditions are nonbinding. As motivated in the introduction, economic agents often behave di¤erently from standard microeconomic theory and the criterion of sustainability of cartel behavior o¤ers an alternative and more robust framework that does not depend on the precise assumptions about cartel behavior. In this perspective, the maximal cartel price characterizes society's maximal damage and can therefore be regarded as a worst-case sce- or are the result of improved e¤ectiveness of leniency programs. Based on our results we are also able to address the last issue. Under a …xed traditional antitrust policy, introducing an ex-ante leniency program does not increase (unobserved) cartel activity. The ex-ante leniency programs in the US and the EC, however, are ine¤ective. Only su¢ ciently large rewards can increase cartel detection through revelation by the cartel. This is a general and robust result that goes far beyond the special cases studied in Spagnolo (2004) , Rey (2003) and Harrington and Chen (2006) .
An important goal set by theoretical articles, see e.g. the survey in Spagnolo (2007) , is the determination of the optimal design of the antitrust policy and the leniency program.
Studying the optimal design requires a well-de…ned framework for analyzing the e¤ects of changes in the antitrust policy and the leniency program on society's welfare. Such changes can be thought of as shaping the functions describing the antitrust policy and the leniency program and, ideally, one would like a ‡exible and large class of such policy functions that are a priori neither constant or linear. Although our analysis did not address optimal design directly, our framework allows for such a rich class of potential policy functions and a characterization of the maximal cartel price. Taking the latter price as a proxy for society's maximal damage, one can easily extend our framework by specifying social welfare as a function of the maximal cartel price and including society's costs of implementing certain policy functions. So, potentially, our framework could enhance the analysis of the optimal design of antitrust policies and leniency programs.
